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Abstract
The publications on the modernized gacaca courts dealing with the legacy of the
Rwandan genocide are abundant and they often seem to be rife with diverging analysis
and conclusions. This article argues that the seeming lack of consensus does not signal
the impossibility of adequately representing the gacaca courts. This article does not
dwell on the crisis of representation. Instead, an effort is made to provide clarity in a
disorder of representations in the context of a political anthropology that works across
localized, national and international networks and dynamics. The process of establishing
a representation of the gacaca courts is scrutinized. Numerical legibility, magic
syllogisms and performative speech lie at the heart of the process that generates an
ideological representation of the modern gacaca courts upheld by the Rwandan regime
and its agents. In addition, a first generation of academic studies on gacaca is character-
ized by magical legalism: they depict a theoretical model that is primarily based on law
or law talk. A second generation of gacaca studies mainly adopt a bottom-up perspec-
tive that is often ethnographically informed. A focus on actual gacaca practice not only
constitutes an alternative research approach but also unmasks and destabilizes the
process of ‘making models’. But dangers exist regarding these alternative types of rep-
resentational strategies as well, especially due to uncritical blurring of reigning models
and actual practice. The analysis suggests new avenues of investigation and reflection in
the fields of the anthropology of transitional justice, international relations and peace-
building.
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The Rwandan genocide was the violent apex of a country history marked by spor-
adic eruptions of ethnic violence as a consequence of the struggle over power (and
wealth) in the course of time, a struggle grafted onto the Hutu–Tutsi ethnic bipo-
larity that marks the Rwandan socio-political landscape. The Hutu are the major-
ity ethnic group with approximately 84 percent of the population, while 14 percent
are Tutsi and 1 percent are Twa. In the years following the 1994 genocide, a tran-
sitional justice process – dealing with the violence of the past – was to find its most
tangible embodiment for the ordinary Rwandan during the numerous gacacameet-
ings in every local community (hill).
The post-genocide Rwandan way of dealing with the past, and the gacaca process
in particular, has received wide attention, often and remarkably with diverging ana-
lysis and conclusions. AWorld Bank report refers to significant steps forward in the
domain of reconciliation and asserts that the gacaca court system has been ‘instru-
mental in advancing reconciliation and accountability following the genocide’
(World Bank, 2004: 1). Some argue that the gacaca process not only fosters recon-
ciliation but also initiates a democratic culture of deliberation and dialogue
(Wierzynska, 2004). Others, however, see gacaca as ‘an exercise in victor’s justice,
coercing participation, restricting freedom of speech on sensitive subjects and col-
lectivizing guilt’ (Waldorf, 2006: 85). Clark (2007) argues that the hybrid nature of
the gacaca system is an asset to the process while others identify it as the weakest link
in the system (Ingelaere, 2008: 25–9). While a minister in 2007 claimed that 75 per-
cent of Rwandans are reconciled (The New Times, 2007), others dismiss the recon-
ciliation process stating that post-genocide justice in Rwanda consists of a return to
feudal structures and subordination for the Hutu (Centre de lutte contre l’impunite´
et l’injustice au Rwanda, 2005). In a discussion on the nature of the Rwandan justice
system (thus including gacaca) Human Rights Watch concluded, after three years of
research, that it operates in a political context that is detrimental to fair trial guar-
antees and that ‘there is an official antipathy to views diverging from those of the
government and the dominant party’ (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 2). William
Schabas, however, who undertook the same exercise, refutes most of the claims by
Human Rights Watch and summarized certain perspectives on Rwanda as ‘unreal-
istic assessments of problems that are more imaginary than real’ (2008: 59). In a final
assessment of the court system Human Rights Watch concluded that ‘the comprom-
ises made in adapting the customary community-based practice to try grave criminal
offences led to significant due process violations being built into the system and a
degree of disappointment on the part of many Rwandans’ (2011: 130). Government
officials responding to the Human Rights Watch report were quoted saying it was
‘abusive and misleading’ and ‘intended to make a mockery of Rwanda’s efforts to
promote justice and reconciliation’ (Mazimpaka, 2011).
Considering these divergent accounts one almost wonders whether these obser-
vers are looking at the same country, the same institution. One might be tempted to
conclude that there are as many gacaca court systems or practices as there are hills
in Rwanda: a thousand as Rwanda’s nickname suggests: ‘the country of a thousand
hills’ (Ingelaere, 2009c).
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This article argues, on the contrary, that it is not impossible to understand the
‘modernized’ gacaca courts system and the social process it generates. Diverging
accounts of the modern gacaca courts in Rwanda have to do with ‘who is looking’
and ‘how one is looking’. The lack of consensus – at first sight – does not signal the
impossibility of understanding gacaca and it does not give rise to an absolute
relativism on gacaca that regards all accounts as relevant and equal. It only signals
an apparent difficulty in separating image from reality and distinguishing the
imaginary from the real, even in well-researched reports and scientific writings.
And it demands an effort to provide clarity with regard to a seeming disorder of
representations.
The objective of this article is to reflect upon the way the modernized gacaca
courts are seen and have been described since their inception and subsequent imple-
mentation on the ground. This is as such more a meta-representation than a rep-
resentation. It is thus not an endeavour to represent the gacaca courts. Our concern
here is the attempt to map the process of establishing the representation of the
gacaca courts.
It is, in fact, our own fieldwork and grassroots experience with the functioning
of the modern gacaca court system that informs this analysis. The exercise under-
taken here is based on a strong familiarity with actual gacaca practice. Therefore,
the meta-representation presented here should be read against the background of
representation(s) of the gacaca practice that are available elsewhere (Ingelaere,
2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2011). These last representations, as well as the
current meta-representation, are informed by an ethnographically driven approach
through which 1917 trials that dealt with the allegations against a total number of
2573 individuals were observed and analysed.
In addition, the analysis in this article is informed by hundreds of formal and
informal interviews and conversations with Rwandans practising gacaca. Over 30
months spread over a period of eight years since 2004 were spent in mainly rural
areas of Rwanda. The objective of these research stays, observations and conver-
sations was the construction of an adequate representation of the modern gacaca
court system. The process of constructing an empirically adequate representation
of the reference reality under investigation should be the objective of any scientific
undertaking. The reference reality is that particular aspect (piece) of social space
and time that the researcher wants to report on and that he/she aims to understand
(Olivier de Sardan, 2008: 8, 47).1 Essential in this scientific process is the fact that
‘representation stems from the principle of the equivalence of the sign and the
real (even if this equivalence is utopian, it is a fundamental axiom)’ (Baudrillard,
1994: 6). We argue that the particular representation of the gacaca courts by the
Rwandan regime constitutes in essence a ‘model’ that is disconnected from the real
world. This representation not only tends to generate a uniformity that does not
exist, it also depicts, to a large extent, a non-existent and thus imaginary reality.
What is more important, however, is the underlying strategy nevertheless to present
this imaginary reality as an empirically adequate representation of the reference
reality. According to Baudrillard a representation that ‘masks the absence of a
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profound reality . . . is of the order of sorcery’ (1994: 6). This is why we shall refer to
magical ways of thinking to render this phenomenon intelligible.
The first section presents a general and very broad overview of the main char-
acteristics of modern gacaca courts. In a subsequent section attention is paid to the
process that generates the particular representation of the modern gacaca courts
upheld by the Rwandan regime: numerical legibility, magic syllogisms and per-
formative speech lie at the heart of the strategy designed to mask the absence of
the actual and profound reference reality of the representation in question. In
addition, a first generation of academic studies on gacaca is characterized by
magical legalism: they depict a theoretical model that is primarily based on law
or law talk.
In the second part of the article we argue that fieldwork approaches that adopt a
bottom-up perspective and that are often ethnographically driven constitute an
alternative approach. They unmask and destabilize the process of ‘making
models’ and the models themselves. These approaches generate representations
that extensively make use of ‘objectified traces of pieces of the real’ (Olivier de
Sardan, 2008: 50). But dangers exist here also. The concepts of ‘magical legalism’
and ‘theoretical magic’ are used to distinguish representations of the gacaca courts
as a mainly imaginary model from empirically adequate representations based on
the actual modernized gacaca practice.
The modernized gacaca courts: an overview
In 1999, after a period of reflection and a round of consultation, a commission
established by the (then) Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu proposed to mod-
ernize and formalize the ‘traditional’ dispute-resolution mechanism called gacaca in
order to deal with the approximately 130,000 persons imprisoned for offences
related to the genocide at that time – a task the ordinary justice system could
not accomplish in a satisfactory way. This commission was the result of and
worked in the context of the so-called Urugwiro meetings,2 which took place
between May 1998 and March 1999. Every Saturday a meeting was held at the
President’s office with ‘representatives of Rwandan society’ to discuss serious prob-
lems facing the Rwandan people. Proposals for solutions were debated. The ques-
tion of justice and dealing with the genocide was given a prominent place on the
agenda. The use of gacaca was decided upon. The report of these meetings
(Republic of Rwanda, 1999) reveals that the name ‘gacaca jurisdictions’ should
be used to suggest that the Rwandan heritage (‘gacaca’) is a source of inspiration
for the new court system which, nevertheless, has the same competence as the
classical courts (‘jurisdiction’). The blueprint of that type of gacaca can be found
in the report of the Urugwiro meetings. It is the embryo of what was later codified
in law, implemented and constantly adapted.
Indeed, the modern gacaca courts are loosely based on a traditional conflict-
resolution mechanism that existed in Rwanda before colonial rule. Conflicts
between families were settled by the old and wise men of the community – the
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inyangamugayo – bringing together the parties in the dispute. These gatherings
were meant to restore order and harmony (Ntampaka, 1995, 2003; UNHCHR,
1996). After independence, gacaca gradually evolved into an institution associated
with state power as local authorities supervised (or took on the role of) inyanga-
mugayo (local judges) (Reyntjens, 1990; Van Houtte et al., 1981). Fieldwork con-
ducted at the time also established that the gacaca was already functioning in its
semi-traditional way in some areas immediately after the end of the genocide
(Rose, 1995; UNHCHR, 1996). It seems clear that the gacaca mostly functioned
as it did before the genocide, meaning that it dealt with minor disputes within the
population.
In the modernized system three fundamental principles – cornerstones – were
incorporated in the gacaca legislation in order to facilitate the process (Ingelaere,
2008). Those suspected of genocide crimes and crimes against humanity are pro-
secuted in parallel courts through a categorization according to the crime com-
mitted. Ordinary courts try those identified as presumably national top responsible
persons and orchestrators, while the gacaca courts judge others – the majority of
the cases – on their respective hills. A second principle is the popularization or
decentralization of justice by installing numerous courts in every administrative
unit of the state. This procedure is loosely modelled on the traditional gacaca with
lay persons presiding as judges and the (active) involvement of the entire popula-
tion as ‘General Assembly’. A final cornerstone is the principle of confession to
increase the evidence and available information. Gacaca trials take place not with
evidence gathered by police and judicial authorities but through the testimonial
practices of perpetrators, victims and bystanders during the trial. It is the discursive
encounter in the gacaca sessions that functions as catalyst of the transitional justice
process.
Numeric legibility
The Rwandan Patriotic Forces (RPF) defeated the regime that was responsible for
the genocide in 1994. As the military victor the RPF was able to set the agenda for
post-genocide Rwanda without much constraint. The post-genocide Rwandan
regime is characterized by ‘transformative authoritarianism’ (Straus and
Waldorf, 2011: 5). President Paul Kagame has repeatedly indicated that he
‘wants to build a new country’ – a wish that needs to be taken literally.
Liberation from a genocidal order is one of the underlying ideological vectors
and legitimization strategies. A bold social engineering campaign has been insti-
tuted in the post-genocide period in order to translate into practice the vision
incorporating, among others, the following set of ideas.
The RPF must be seen as aiming to create the true postcolonial Rwanda. The
colonial powers distorted the essence of Rwandan culture and this colonial mindset
sustained the first two republics between 1962 and 1994. Rwandanness or
Rwandanicity, not ethnicity, should define relations between state and society.
Building or (re-)establishing this unity of Rwandans goes together with eradicating
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the ‘genocide ideology’. Reconciliation, an element that had begun to dominate the
post-1994 ideological framework by the end of the 1990s, is also couched in terms
of unity, while the overall objective of justice for genocide crimes (in the sense of
accountability) has been one of the cornerstones of the regime.
Home-grown traditions derived from the Rwandan socio-cultural fabric need to
replace imported, divisive practices. Gacaca is one of them.3 These institutions are
seen as part of what is called ‘the building of a democratic culture’ that is in essence
conceived as being ‘closer to the consensus-based type of democracy’ (Rwanda,
2006a: 151).
The choice and installation of the gacaca courts thus fit perfectly into this vision.
They are considered to be home-grown and are presented as an almost pre-colonial
resource; the courts are meant to fight genocide and eradicate the culture of impun-
ity. In addition, they need to reconcile Rwanda and Rwandans. The gacaca courts,
as an institution, are as such a mechanism in a larger campaign of social engineer-
ing that needs to transform this vision into reality as well as transforming reality
into this vision, as we will explain later.
It is within the above detailed ideological framework and from the vantage point
of social engineering that the gacaca courts are ‘seen’ by the Rwandan regime. It is
thus not at all surprising that the gacaca courts are also talked about in the lan-
guage that belongs to such a campaign after their implementation on the ground.
Especially the ‘numerical’ and ‘aggregate’ facts are of interest to a state, as James
Scott (1998: 80) explains in his analysis of how states see society. What is indeed
striking about the communication by state actors on the actual gacaca proceedings
is the dominance of the numerical in the discourse.4 That is, the quantitative
accomplishments of the gacaca process: number of cases compiled, number of
accused according to category and administrative structure, number of judges
elected or trained or replaced etc., number of judgments pronounced, number of
motorbikes handed out to staff, number of trauma cases, number of killings in the
margins of the gacaca process . . . 5 – the list is virtually endless.
Magic syllogisms
The communication is not only about numbers, of course. The gacaca legislation is
also often referred to. But the reference reality of the actual gacaca practice is often
represented by using numerical facts, thus through a process of ‘counting’. In
addition, in its communication on gacaca since its inception, government sources
consistently evoke the following elements:6 it is a home-grown solution derived
from Rwandan culture; the court system guarantees equitable justice and respects
fundamental human rights; the truth surfaces through the gacaca proceedings and
the court system accelerates dealing with the backlog of genocide-related cases; it is
popular justice (referring to both its origins and the nature of the participation of
the population); confession, remorse and pardon are the cornerstones of the gacaca
process; and, finally, justice through the modernized gacaca is essentially
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restorative and reconciliatory. With the gacaca process well under way on a
national scale since 2005, these characteristics are no longer presented as a
scheme, a project to be implemented or the objectives of such a project but as
the characteristics of the actual gacaca practice.
The question is whether these more qualitative or evaluative characterizations
are an adequate description of the actual gacaca practice that constitutes the ref-
erence reality. First, what is clear is that these descriptions match the general
ideological framework and the objectives of gacaca derived from this framework
as detailed above. It is evident that the design of the system shapes the actual
gacaca practice and thus also the participants’ behaviour and perceptions. To
that extent it is conceivable, although not absolutely necessary, that the practice
generally corresponds with the overall scheme. Such is the objective of all grand
schemes in implementation. Nevertheless, in the case of the Rwandan gacaca courts
the question needs to be asked whether and to what extent this is the case, thus
whether the characterizations of the gacaca practice by the regime are accurately
capturing the reference reality in question.
It is questionable whether this representation adequately depicts the reference
reality. For the simple reason that it is inconceivable for a visionary authoritarian
state to have a reality different from its vision, to have a gap between the scheme
and its implementation. Since there is no perceived difference between vision and
reality, it is also impossible to communicate differently about the actual observed
practice once the vision is being implemented.
The writings of one of these state actors, General Frank Rusagara, provide
testimony with regard to this phenomenon. Rusagara is one of the ideologues of
the regime. In several publications he outlines the Rwandan regime’s vision on
the modern gacaca courts, which consistently contains the elements detailed
above (Rusagara, 2005). In an opinion article published in the government-
friendly newspaper he reiterates these claims (Rusagara, 2006). In addition, he
gives some examples of discussions he had on gacaca with Rwandan youth in
so-called ingandos. Ingandos are civic education camps, to which we will return
later. Some of the participants evoked the retributive or punitive character of
gacaca (probably based on their actual experience of gacaca) and highlighted the
fact that the modern gacaca practice was a source of insecurity. Rusagara replied
that ‘this illustrates how the spirit of gacaca is misunderstood’. And he repeats
the dominant government view on the modern gacaca: it is a restorative type of
justice etc. Regarding the security concerns, he replies that ‘the right to security is
enshrined in the Constitution under the bill of rights. Therefore, the government,
in ensuring security for all, does not favour any one group.’
What Rusagara states on security is, in fact, a sort of ‘magic syllogism’ (Cohen,
2002: 108). Cohen uses this term in his book, States of Denial, to refer to the
techniques of denial that governments use to counter accusations of wrongdoing.
An allegation cannot be true since the act is illegal according to domestic legisla-
tion, the constitution or the ratification of international treaties and conventions.
According to Rusagara there can be no insecurity since the law guarantees security.
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What is in any case out of sight is the reference reality of the gacaca practice in such
a response.
Magical legalism
There are evidently many other ‘observers’ of the modern gacaca courts apart from
the Rwandan state and its agents. Analyses of the legal and institutional frame-
work were gradually published with the invention and gradual shaping of the
contours and objectives of the ‘new’ gacaca system. The model of justice emerging
from these first steps led initially to a wide array of reflections, almost all from a
normative or purely theoretical perspective (Betts, 2005; Corey and Joireman,
2004; Daly, 2002; Digneffe and Fierens, 2003; Drumbl, 2000a, 2000b, 2005;
Fierens, 2005; Gaparayi, 2001; Goldstein Bolocan, 2004; Harrell, 2003; Kirkby,
2006; Lin, 2005; Longman, 2006; McKenna, 2006; Ntampaka, 2003; Raper, 2005;
Reyntjens and Vandeginste, 2001; Sarkin, 2000, 2001; Schabas, 2005; Staub, 2004;
Tiemessen, 2004; Uvin, 2003, n.d.; Uvin and Mironko, 2003; Vandeginste, 1999,
2000; Venter, 2007; Wells, 2005; Wierzynska, 2004). Human rights organizations
primarily analysed and criticized the emerging gacaca model from a legal human
rights perspective (Amnesty International, 2000, 2002a, 2002b; Human Rights
Watch, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2004). The framework of intervention and inter-
national support and monitoring (in the field of human rights) related to the intro-
duction of the gacaca system also attracted attention when the gacaca
implementation slowly gained momentum (Chakravarty, 2006; Meyerstein, 2007;
Oomen, 2005).
It is evident that the majority of these studies are primarily legalistic and/or the-
oretical since they were almost all written before the nationwide implementation of
the modernized gacaca on Rwanda’s hills. At that time, the gacaca laws, policy
documents and – occasionally – interviews with practitioners and policy-makers
were the only ‘sources’ available. When taking that element into account many
studies were and still are instructive. In addition some studies analysed the opinion
and aspirations of the people of Rwanda regarding the genocide legislation and
gacaca courts (African Rights, 2000; Babalola et al., n.d.; Gasibirege and
Babalola, 2001; Liprodhor, 2000; Longman et al, 2004; Morril, 2004; Republic of
Rwanda, 2003). The latter studies present a bottom-up and empirically informed
perspective but are representations of popular attitudes and opinions on gacaca
before its (nationwide) implementation.
Revealing is the fact that many of these studies use the term ‘model’. What some
studies seemed to forget is that at this stage, the ‘modern gacaca’ as it was emerging
on paper and in the minds of policy-makers, practitioners and observers was simply
that: a legal and theoretical model. McEvoy (2007), following Cohen in States of
Denial (2002), uses the term ‘magical legalism’ for these types of representations.
All these types of representations of the modernized gacaca system have something
in common: they are disconnected from the ‘real world’. They are primarily based
on law or law talk.
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In these studies the magic of the legalism is neutralized when the conditional
status, the normative, the assumption or the prediction is identified through word-
use and phrasings of a specific kind: such as ‘should’, ‘ought’, ‘might’, ‘needs’,
‘could’, ‘seeks’, ‘has the potential’, ‘has the objective’, ‘it is believed’ ‘the prospect
is’, etc. A good example of such a careful wording in the numerous writings on the
gacaca courts is the study by Daly (2002). Or by stating, as Mark Drumbl does, for
example, that ‘the success or failure of gacaca remains unproven and contingent’
(2005: 59). But one is dealing with magical legalism in full force when there are
simple statements of ‘is’ or ‘will’. An example is the study by Wierzynska (2004).
Without any trace of an insight into the actual gacaca practice, the author simply
states that her analysis of the modern gacaca courts ‘demonstrate[s] how it helps to
promote participation and contestations’ etc.
Magical thinking: performative speech
General Rusagara’s reply regarding the security concerns – referred to above – thus
has something ‘magic’ to it. But also the characterization of gacaca as restorative,
guaranteeing due process and human rights, etc. contains a ‘magical’ dimension.
These characterizations of the gacaca courts are so-called ‘constatives’, according
to classical categorization in the philosophy of language. They are truth-evaluable,
thus true or false depending on the empirical verification of the utterances.
However, from the perspective of the Rwandan government and its actors –
such as Rusagara – these characterizations of the gacaca process are ‘performa-
tives’ (Austin, 1962) or ‘speech acts’ (Searle, 1969). A declarative performative
utterance, such as in the case of the gacaca characterization by regime agents, is
a speech act that changes the reality in accord with the proposition of the declar-
ation. The act of saying simply makes it true. Normally this is the case in, for
example, marriage ceremonies (‘I pronounce you man and wife’) or a judicial ver-
dict (pronouncing someone guilty or innocent). In these cases the existing reality is
changed through the utterance. As Malinowski explained in Magic, Science and
Religion (1954) this is a type of magical thinking in which words are thought to
have the ability to directly affect the world. We argue that in the case of the gacaca
characterization by the Rwandan regime something similar is at stake.
One could object that this is a common practice of governments and that what
are considered as being performative utterances from the perspective of the
Rwandan regime remain simply constative utterances that are truth-evaluable by
the audience. Indeed, that is exactly what the practice-based, bottom-up represen-
tations of the gacaca courts and the dynamics they generate do (or better, should
do, since they have varying success as we will explain below). However, the per-
formative aspect of the characterization of the gacaca courts largely resides in the
underlying and largely ritualized strategies to produce this particular representa-
tion of the gacaca process as a reality. Instead of adapting the scheme to the actual
perceptions and experiences the authoritarian state will go the other way around
and adapt the latter to the scheme.
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As such, performative speech:
will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings,
thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it may
be done with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them. (Austin, 1962: 101)
And magical thinking generally goes hand in hand with ritualistic performances
such as ceremonies, gatherings, festivities, etc. Two of these quasi-ritual strategies
aimed at producing particular thoughts potentially followed by desired actions of
the audience are used with respect to the modern gacaca courts. One is designed for
the audience inside Rwanda, the other targets the outside world. Both are aimed at
reducing the truth-evaluability of the government-produced gacaca representation.
Through their performative force these strategies create this representation as real-
ity, thus as adequately depicting the reference reality in question.
The authoritarian state can to a great extent transform reality and mould it to its
vision. But reality is always resilient to artificial transformations, especially in the
consciousness of (segments of) the population. Since the regime fails to actually
fully implement its vision on the ground, it decides to go the other way round:
representations of reality are adjusted to its vision.
When Danielle de Lame conducted fieldwork in Rwanda in the late 1980s, she
noticed that all public gatherings – whether festive religious events, ritualized
public drinking activities or ‘politico-private’ gatherings – ‘serve to transmit mean-
ing, provide the instruments of memorization, and create consensus’ (2005: 303).
What she saw as a cultural predilection for consensus was, of course, encouraged
and enhanced after the 1994 genocide as part of the massive effort to restore order
and maintain security. Sensitization campaigns, commemoration ceremonies,
speeches by dignitaries, and re-education programmes – the so-called ingando
and itorero – are intended not only to eradicate ‘genocide ideology’ but also to
promote a specific image of Rwanda, a desired representation.
It is primarily through the ingando (and its derivatives such as itorero) that the
government’s gacaca representation (and many other representations) is given per-
formative force inside Rwanda. We mentioned that General Rusagara made his
‘magical’ remarks in an ingando. And the overall characterization of gacaca as
detailed above comes from the course manual used during the ingando camps.
This is no coincidence. ingando is not only about re-education but as much
about political indoctrination (Mgbako, 2005), social control (Thomson, 2011a)
and the reproduction of power (Purdekova, 2008, 2011).7
I have personally observed, through participant observation in an ingando for
demobilized rebels and through an analysis of several diaries I asked participants to
keep during their stay in ingandos (throughout the country), that the ingando is the
prime locus where the gap between vision and reality is bridged; that is, in the
minds of its participants. The ideas propagated during the teaching sessions
addressing particular topics, such as for example the modern gacaca courts, are
given performative force by means of a range of strategies. The physical setting of
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the camp is important, where normal activities are suspended and where partici-
pants are obliged to wear military fatigues that strip from them the outward mani-
festations of their individual particularities. Another strategy is the use of songs.
The themes of the songs tacitly underscore some ideas propagated during the re-
education sessions, and the act of singing is a sort of mnemonic device supporting
the teaching activities. At night and at the end of every teaching session, the stu-
dents collectively sing songs that are very militaristic:8
Aieh Aiehh, my military commander gives me my firearm SMG,
I see the infiltrator
I see him crawling on the ground
I see him in the banana plantation
My military commander gives me my firearm SMG.
I see the infiltrator.9
The songs often deal with issues of good and evil, friend and enemy.10 These
themes refer back to the physical acts of violence experienced by Rwandans in
the past, and the songs contain references to ideas and thoughts. A verse in one
of the songs goes as follows:
On the battlefield, I will never be discouraged
As long as the enemy has not renounced his ideas
Let’s unite to fight the enemy
Victory will be on our side.11
Although there have been no overt hostilities on Rwandan soil for several years,
the songs continue to address the issue of the battlefield and the enemy or evil that
needs to be eradicated. Since there is no physical enemy (in the military sense of the
word) inside Rwanda, and bearing in mind the objectives of the ingando and itorero
activities, it seems clear that the songs also refer to the enemy within, that is, inside
oneself. As a result, one of the enduring consequences of participation in ingando is
the adoption of a sort of auto-censorship (kwibwiriza). The repeated act of singing
gives the ideas propagated in the camp performative force while other opinions are
subtly repressed.
One of these songs indirectly deals with the gacaca by addressing the gacaca
objectives of unity and reconciliation. In the same song, the issue of responses to
different opinions, as well as the good/bad Rwandan (or visitor to Rwanda) surface:
I will be at the Rwandan frontier with the eyes fixed towards those approaching
The one transporting the basket of peace, unity and reconciliation,
I will show him my smile and will let him pass
The one presenting himself differently,
I will stop him and I will force him to change opinion,
Oh Rwanda, I love you.12
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It seems clear that people with certain opinions are not welcome in Rwanda. The
opinions that are accepted are those propagated during the ingando sessions, which
includes opinions that are more magical than real.
The examples mentioned above are indications of the approach adopted inside
Rwanda. Several strategies are deployed to influence the image of Rwanda for
outside consumption and thus also the outsiders’ understanding of the gacaca
courts. Often this comes down to denial (Reyntjens, 2011), at times by using the
magic syllogisms referred to above. Recently another strategy, one that needs to
give the speech acts made by the regime performative force in the outside world,
became known through the publication of an agreement made in 2009 between
the Rwandan government and a public relations firm (U.S. Department of
Justice, 2011a).13 A detailed public relations campaign was agreed upon that
had to create a positive ‘bottom-up narrative’ ‘to educate audiences about the
new Rwanda’. Thanks to the adopted communication strategies such a narrative
seems to flourish organically but it, nevertheless, corresponds with the desired
representations of the Rwandan regime. ‘Gacaca as a just solution’ figures prom-
inently as something to be branded worldwide next to two other themes:
‘Rwanda’s Miracle: The Healing of a Nation’ and ‘Rwanda’s Visionary
Leader’. Apparently, ‘offensive and defensive strategies to shape perceptions’
were deployed through media outlets that have ‘the greatest possibility to
shape opinion’. One of the strategies entails ‘erecting walls of pro-Rwandan
data’.
Hardly anywhere there is a concern or a reflection by the public relations firm
whether they also communicate about something that has an actual reference real-
ity including the representation of the gacaca courts they send around the globe.
They simply seem to accept the representation of gacaca courts presented to them
by the Rwandan regime. This does not have to be surprising for this PR-firm. The
fact that it executed a similar campaign for Gaddhafi’s Libya not so long ago is
telling in that respect (U.S. Department of Justice, 2011b).14 As Pottier observed
(2002: 207), ‘reality is what Rwanda’s political leaders, as moral guardians tell the
world . . . it is.’
Destabilizing the model: the gacaca practice
An understanding of the nature of the operation of the gacaca courts and the social
process it generates in the wider Rwandan society only became possible since their
implementation nationwide in 2005. During the initial stages of the gacaca practice
almost no studies were based on in-depth field research, with the notable exception
of the reports of non-governmental organizations that followed the gacaca activ-
ities on-site in the pilot areas and subsequently nationwide; they were rather meant
for operational purpose but also provided – to varying degrees – interesting
insights. Penal Reform International focused mainly on the social dimension of
the gacaca practice, Lawyers without Borders (Avocats sans Frontie`res – ASF)
adopted a purely legal perspective.15
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Academic studies that actually do focus on the gacaca practice and provide an in-
depth insight in the gacaca practice are increasing, but remain limited as of 2012 –
when the official end of the operational phase of the gacaca process (Hirondelle
News Agency, 2011) will be proclaimed (Broune´us, 2008, 2010; Buckley-Zistel,
2005; Burnet, 2008; Clark, 2007, 2008, 2010; Doughty, 2011; Honeyman et al.,
2004; Honeyman and Meierhenrich, 2002; Ingelaere, 2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b,
2009c, 2011; Karekezi et al., 2004; Megwalu and Loizides, 2010; Molenaar, 2005;
Rettig, 2008, 2011; Rime´ et al., 2011; Takeuchi, 2011; Thomson, 2011b; Thomson
and Nagy, 2010; Van Billoen, 2008;Waldorf, 2006, 2010). In addition, the Rwandan
government as well as NGOs have undertaken impact studies to understand the
actual gacaca practice (African Rights, 2008; Republic of Rwanda, 2007, 2008,
2010). The actual methodological approach, the research techniques used and the
interpretative process might vary in each of these studies but the central concern is
the actual practice of the modernized gacaca courts.
The studies that take the gacaca practice as reference reality should be char-
acterized by three elements. First, a bottom-up approach that is practice- and
perception-based. Second, the author doing fieldwork should be able to physic-
ally and psychologically move far away from the centre of society (Ingelaere,
2010). The Rwandan establishment operating at the centre of society is crafting
a preferred image of the country through active interference in scientific research
projects, through the cultivation of an aesthetics of progress and through the
subtle use of a complex communication code.16 Third, such an approach should
be characterized – especially with respect to the final stages of constructing the
findings – as aware of and critical to varying degrees of what we have called
‘magic’ in the processes that generate state and academic representations of the
gacaca courts.
The above-mentioned studies adopt these three principles to varying degrees.
Based on the findings of this type of studies some general trends are evident that
question the government’s representation of the gacaca courts as well as many
aspects of the dominant ‘magical legal’ gacaca model as depicted in the first gen-
eration of academic studies on gacaca. As mentioned previously, the latter mostly
relied on legal documents as well as normative and theoretical assumptions. Most
of the academic studies that adopt a bottom-up perspective – a second generation
of gacaca studies – agree on these trends with the notable exception of Phil Clark
(2007, 2008, 2010).
Theoretical magic
Therefore, some particular attention needs to be paid to Phil Clark’s representation
of the modernized gacaca courts in his book The Gacaca Courts, Post-genocide
Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda (2010) since it is largely presented as a
bottom-up perspective. It is, as the back cover states, even ‘an ethnographic inves-
tigation’ based on ‘seven years of fieldwork’ in Rwanda that ‘explores the ways in
which Rwandans interpret gacaca’.
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The use of the term ‘ethnography’ suggests that an important part of the data
were gathered through participant observation, the prime characteristic of ethnog-
raphy (Atkinson et al., 2001: 4–5). In addition, the objective of focusing on
Rwandan interpretations of gacaca suggests that we can expect a mainly emic
point of view, that is, a representation in which important categories and meanings
emerged from the ethnographic encounter rather than being imposed from the
‘outside’ based on existing models and theories. For three reasons the book does
not contain such a representation of the gacaca courts.
First, from the outset Clark aims at something else, namely: ‘to more clearly
analyse what gacaca is designed to achieve than most observers – and many
participants in gacaca – have done so far’ (2010: 4). The focus is thus on the
design of gacaca, ‘the model’, not its double, the actual practice. In addition it
suggests ‘an interpretation of the interpretations’ of the modern gacaca not an
interpretation of the modern gacaca. And that is what Clark is actually doing: he
interprets representations of the modern gacaca: those of political actors,
so-called ‘academic commentators’ and ‘the population’. For Clark these are
all simply ‘sources’ that need to be scrutinized, even disciplined from his vantage
point of panoptical insight. Representations need to be carefully weighed and the
best ‘arguments’ will win the debate. The criterion for winning the ‘debate’ is thus
mainly rhetorical skill and theoretical force, not the extent of empirical rigour
deployed in the process of constructing the representation of the gacaca courts as
a reference reality. This is not what an ethnography generally sets out to do and
it does not bring us any closer to an understanding of what the modern gacaca
actually is.
Second, as the previous quote also reveals, Clark wants to analyse gacaca
‘better’ than its participants, the Rwandans who actually practise gacaca on the
hills in Rwanda. Indeed, he states throughout the book that a significant number of
the practice- and perception-based insights of the population need to be rejected
(Clark, 2010: 230) or countered (2010: 248). What Phil Clark is doing is to a certain
extent similar to what Rusagara does in his op-ed article: the population says X or
does X (because he has observed this either during his own fieldwork or that of
others), but Clark says the objective of gacaca is Y (remember: his aim is to analyse
the design), thus X is wrong. The question is whether this can even remotely gen-
erate an insight into the gacaca courts as a reference reality?
Third, although Clark’s concern is in fact different from constructing an ade-
quate representation of the actual gacaca practice, he, nevertheless, attempts to
have this other perspective pass as an adequate representation of gacaca. To do so,
he uses the magical devices we identified above as well as other rhetorical tricks. On
page 195, for example, it is stated: ‘This view of open truth-telling largely reflects
the influence of the traditional institution of gacaca’, and on page 164 it is stated
that popular participation in gacaca is ‘a valuable systemic expression of a
Rwandan worldview of human identity as communally embedded and ‘‘truth’’,
both legal and non-legal, as a negotiated outcome reached via communal discus-
sion in public settings’. Nowhere in the entire body of empirically informed
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sociological or anthropological work on Rwanda can something be found that
would support these assertions. They seem more of the order of ‘theoretical magic’.
According to Sir James Frazer (1993: 11) in The Golden Bough, theoretical magic
is ‘a spurious system of natural law’, that is, it is thus a non-genuine ‘statement of
the rules which determine the sequence of events throughout the world’. While the
statement that gacaca is restorative or retributive solely based on the model should
be considered as magical legalism, the statement that the truth leads to healing and
reconciliation as such and also in the Rwandan context should be considered as
‘theoretical magic’. There is hardly any empirical evidence that the latter statement
is actually true, let alone that it would be true in Rwanda (Broune´us, 2008, 2010;
Buckley-Zistel, 2005a; Ingelaere, 2007, 2009b).
Magical realism
Another rhetorical device used by Clark is ‘forgetting’ the element of time in the
production of gacaca representations. Clark correctly typifies the modern gacaca
courts as a dynamic, lived socio-legal institution. What he forgets is that the rep-
resentations of gacaca, especially in academic writings, are also dynamic in kind.
We have mentioned that there is a first and a second generation of academic studies
on gacaca. In Clark’s analysis representations of the gacaca courts as practice are
questioned by referring to studies conducted before the launch of the actual gacaca
practice. Clark thus invokes counter-arguments presented in studies that simply
depict the model and all its ‘magical’ thinking that goes with it.
The seemingly confusing ‘debate’ that Clark is trying to depict and settle –
political actors versus the academic observers versus the population, but especially
also the ‘debate’ he evokes within the academic community – can only produce the
conclusions Clark reaches because he is not taking into account the issue of time.
The debate on differing representations by academics is not a debate any longer (or
a different debate) when one takes into account that not everyone is (has been)
talking and writing about the same gacaca courts. Some refer to the model, others
to its double, the practice.
Notice how the representations byWaldorf and Ingelaere are continuously coun-
tered by those of Karekezi and Gasibirigi (Clark, 2010: 141–5, 174, 201–5, 245–8,
327, 330–1 for example). The fact that the latter are Rwandan does not make the
difference as Clark suggests. What is more revealing is the fact that the studies of
Gasibirigi only deal with attitudes towards gacaca before its implementation on the
ground. An additional study deals with the election of the inyangamugayo in 2002,
long before the actual start of gacaca on the ground. The studies of Karekezi are
equally based on the elections of gacaca judges in 2002 and some preliminary insights
into the gacaca practice based on the information-collection phase in a pilot gacaca
court.17 Waldorf’s and Ingelaere’s representations of gacaca are based on the actual
gacaca practice in all its dimensions. That does not give the latter studies free passage
however. They are open for scrutiny regarding the empirical rigour deployed to come
to the representation of the gacaca courts. But that does not mean that they can be
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solely challenged based on theoretical ideas and normative assumptions. On page
247 these same authors are ‘corrected’ by invoking Harrell (2003) and his depiction
of the gacaca courts as essentially restorative. Harrell’s study of gacaca was done
before the implementation and depicts the ‘model’. Notice, therefore, also the careful
wording by Harrel, ‘it may’, which Clark also uses. Nevertheless, the conditional
becomes a descriptive in Clark’s narrative. The question is again how this can be an
interesting way of ‘assessing’ something.
Another rhetorical trick, apart from masking the element of time, is calling
something a misrepresentation of gacaca after having misrepresented that repre-
sentation in the first place. For example, according to Phil Clark (2010: 325–31)
many authors conclude that the modern gacaca courts are not (easily) facilitating
reconciliation. And he, in fact, comes to a similar conclusion based on his insight
into the actual gacaca practice (Clark, 2010: 309). What he subsequently does,
however, is to state that these authors come to such a conclusion because the
system is wrongly depicted as being to a great extent retributive. What Phil
Clark does here is to consider the representations of the actual practice of
gacaca as if they were a normative point of view, an advocacy attempt for legalistic
assessments. Clark suggests that all these representations are the result of a par-
ticular approach, namely ‘human rights as retribution’ that dominates the transi-
tional justice paradigm. In doing so, Clark follows McEvoy (2007) has (rightly)
called for letting go of legalism, both in the design and assessment of transitional
justice initiatives. However, the fact that these studies use the word ‘retributive’ has
more to do with an insight into the actual gacaca practice than the adoption of a
particular legalistic or human rights perspective.
The following type of reasoning is prominent throughout his book: transitional
justice should create positive non-legal social outcomes; the gacaca courts are an
instance of transitional justice; conclusion: the gacaca courts create positive non-
legal outcomes. Notice the blurring of normative and descriptive propositions. It is
this type of reasoning that necessitates discarding the reference reality for the
conclusions to remain valid. As we have argued, it requires rhetorical skill, selective
reading and magical thinking to maintain the conclusion. As a consequence, the
result is more of the order of magical realism: the blurring of real-world insights
with elements that are more imaginary than real. Clark consistently mixes his the-
oretical/normative concern for non-legalistic forms of transitional justice processes
with the actual representations of the modern gacaca courts. The first position can
be defended and is interesting. In fact, adequate representations of the gacaca
practice may even give rise to a defence of such a position. Note, however, that
it is a theoretical/normative position. As such it should give rise to the necessity for
gacaca’s ‘architects [to] reflect upon how instantiating some of its informal and
communal aspects could boost its restorative and reconciliatory potential’
(Drumbl, 2007: 99). Instead of going back to the drawing board and adjusting
the model on paper, Phil Clark decided to misrepresent the actual modern gacaca
practice. In doing so we hardly learn anything about the model nor the actual
gacaca practice.
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Conclusion
When trying to understand the actual functioning of the gacaca courts one needs to
be aware of the ideological representations made by state actors and the performa-
tive strategies undertaken to promote these representations. Second, it is necessary
to identify ‘magical’ thinking in the processes of generating gacaca representations.
These strategies mask the fact that the representations mainly refer to an ideo-
logical and normative, thus preconceived, idea of what the gacaca courts ought to
be. An ideological or normative representation has no reference reality but it can be
projected onto a reference reality. It can even be projected as the reference reality.
In these cases, however, something goes wrong in the process of establishing and
guaranteeing the empirical adequacy between the reference reality and its repre-
sentation. In doing so, one invokes ‘a reality that is in fact different’ (Olivier de
Sardan, 2008: 269). As a consequence this representation is more imaginary than
real. The reference reality of the gacaca courts is its practice, it is not the gacaca
model on paper and in the discourse of the regime’s agents.
The emergence of gacaca both as model and subsequently as practice is a
dynamic process. This is also the case in the writings that represent the gacaca
courts. In that regard notice the seemingly remarkable changes in the represen-
tations made by authors who have followed the developments of the gacaca
courts over the years: compare for example Drumbl (2005) and Drumbl (2007)
as well as Longman (2006) and Longman (2009). These might seem to be
‘strange’ changes of opinion, but they can actually be considered as examples
of sound scientific reasoning where the representation is adapted according to the
available insights. Some authors seem to have a hard time doing so, despite
the available evidence: compare Clark (2007) and Clark (2010). It signals a dif-
ficulty to distinguish the model from practice or simply a continued preference
for the model.
With the gacaca practice actually under way and even completed, the magic
should have been reduced. But ‘magical thinking’ continues to haunt gacaca stu-
dies. There is often a continuous shifting in the same study between the model and
the actual practice (Clark, 2010; Karbo and Mutisi, 2008). Some authors who do
not adopt a bottom-up, practice-based approach try to reduce the magical – with
varying success – by incorporating secondary insights into the actual gacaca prac-
tice (Lahiri, 2009, Nagy, 2009; Sosnov, 2007–2008; Westberg, 2010). Some plainly
curb the magic in the process of representing gacaca by stating that they are simply
adopting a theoretical/normative perspective on the gacaca courts as a model
(Haile, 2008).
In the meantime the gacaca courts continue to give rise to all kinds of studies.
For example, with respect to the customary status of the modern gacaca courts
(Haveman, 2011), donor support (Schotsmans, 2011) or the issue of sexual violence
(Olwine, 2011). Many recent studies adopt a comparative perspective on the gacaca
courts by situating them in the broader framework of all judicial responses to the
Rwandan genocide (Apuuli, 2009; De Ycaza, 2010; Jones, 2010; Webster, 2011;
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Westberg, 2010) or with other so-called customary approaches in other countries
and cultures (Baker, 2007; Jones and Nestor, 2011). As a consequence, a represen-
tation of the gacaca courts will be used to explore topics of wider global interest
and relevance (Drumbl, 2007; Fenrich et al, 2011; Huyse and Salter, 2008; Quinn,
2009; Shaw and Waldorf, 2010). This is a trend that will probably increase in the
future since it is convenient to spur ongoing debates with ‘known’ examples or
assess upcoming state schemes to be implemented with experiences from the past.
Before doing so, as we have argued, it seems necessary to carefully unmask ideo-
logical or theoretical ‘models’.
Notes
1. The English term ‘reference reality’ is based on the translation provided by Jean-Pierre
Olivier de Sardan during a workshop at Roskilde University (Olivier de Sardan, n.d.).
2. Urugwiro refers to the location of the presidential office where the meetings took place.
3. Gacaca thus joins imihigo (performance contracts), abunzi (mediation committees),
ingando and itorero (solidarity or re-education camps), ubudehe (community develop-
ment planning) and umuganda (community work).
4. See for example the majority of the documents on the website of the National Service of
the Gacaca Courts (SNJG) (http: //www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/
EnIntroduction.htm). Not only the website but also the actual communication of
these state agents have similar characteristics. See for example the PowerPoint presen-
tation entitled ‘Le processus des juridictions Gacaca au Rwanda’, made by the executive
secretary of the National Gacaca Service, Domitilla Mukantaganzwa, during a confer-
ence on judicial reforms in Kigali on 18 June 2008 (Mukantaganzwa, 2008, on file with
the author).
5. And the numeric does not necessarily have to be correct. For example, with respect to
the gacaca courts’ proceedings, many state actors refer to numbers ranging from 860,000
to 1.4 million ‘persons’ accused and processed through the gacaca system, while these
numbers actually refer to ‘cases’. One ‘person’ can be linked to multiple ‘cases’.
6. The enumeration of these characteristics are based on the ingando manual (Republic of
Rwanda, 2006b: 154–7).
7. Purdekova (2011: 34–7) also evokes the performative aspects of ingando camps but more
their physical (setting and actions) than their psychological aspects (speech acts and the
change of representations) as we do.
8. The songs referred to were recorded in the diary of a student attending an ingando for
students in the second half of 2009.
9. Translated from the original:
Aie aiehh Afande mpa silaha ya njye SMG,
Umucengezi ndamubonye,
Mubonye akororinga,mubonye mu rutoki,
Afande mpa silaha ya njye SMG
umucengezi ndamubonye.
10. The songs resemble the ibyivugo, the ‘self-laudatory warlike poems’ (de Lame, 2005: 489)
from the pre-colonial era.
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11. Translated from the original:
Murugamba sinzananirwa niba umwanzi atarava ku izima
Dufatanye turwanye umwanzi
Kumunesha ntibizatunanira.
12. Translated from the original:
Nzahagarara ku nkike zawe
Rwanda mpange amaso abaza bakugana
Uwikoreye agaseke k’amahoro n’ubumwe n’ubwiyunge ,
Nzamusekera mubise, naho uzana ibitaribyo nzamukumira mukure ku izima
Rwanda Ndagukunda.
13. The issue was earlier referred to in a British newspaper (Booth, 2010).
14. It seems an additional London based PR firm was paid by the Rwandan government to,
among other things, denounce accusations of genocide crimes by Rwanda in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as an interview with a representative of the
PR firm that was recorded with a hidden camera reveals (Newman and Wright, 2011).
15. See the reports on the website of Penal Reform International (http: //www.penalrefor-
m.org/publications/gacaca-research-reports), and the reports on the website of Avocats
sans Frontie`res (http: //www.asf.be/fr/publications).
16. For concrete examples of these three strategies see Ingelaere (2010).
17. The gacaca practice was organized in two phases. After election of judges in 2002, the
information-collection phase started in 2005 and ‘officially’ lasted until mid 2006. In mid
2006 the trial phase started. During the latter phase, actual hearings took place and
verdicts were pronounced.
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